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The usual reading of Spinoza is that the mind is the idea of the body-actual, entities outside of which are known only indirectly, through their effects on the body-actual; to greater clarity and knowledge there corresponds, under the attribute of extension, greater causal interaction between body-actual and world. On this reading, Spinoza is very hard to defend; my idea of the kitchen stove is not an idea of the effects of the kitchen stove on my body-actual.
But suppose the mind corresponds to the bodycosmic; it is quite defensible to say that perception is the proprioception of the body-cosmic. Insofar as we interact causally with all of nature, but to different degrees, the body-cosmic has no clear boundaries — it has the form of a cross, not a circle; but it can be said to be extended to the degree that direct and indirect causal interaction between the body-actual and its world is increased — not just any interaction, however, but that which serves to maintain the equilibrium of the system.
The more we are sensitive to the world around us, and the more we control it, the more it is part of us. Thus at Ethics IV, p. Curley, p. For I take it that Spinoza recognises the existence of partconatuses conatuses of parts of the body-actual which, while they may be harmful if they override the conatus of the individual as a whole, have legitimate claims to balanced satisfaction within that conatus. But if the conatus of the individual as a whole is not that of the body-actual but of the bodycosmic, then conatuses of parts of the body-cosmic, whether or not within the body-actual, can enter their claims.
So that, to the extent that my active and passive powers are increased, the world becomes to a greater degree my world — more of the universe becomes more closely incorporated into my body-cosmic; correspondingly, its claims on me are greater.
In Defence of Objectivity (Routledge Studies in Critical Realism) - PDF Free Download
As an interpretation of Spinoza, this would be far-fetched, for he is undeniably anthropocentric: Apart from men [homines] we know no singular thing in nature whose Mind we can enjoy, and which we can join to ourselves in friendship, or some kind of association. And so, whatever there is in nature apart from men, the principle of seeking our own advantage does not demand that we preserve it. Instead, it teaches us to preserve or destroy it according to its use, or to adapt it to our use in any way whatsoever. Our attitude to death bears witness to that. We fear the dissolution of our world, rather than of our body-actual.
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Freedom in the common world This conception of our place in the world has several consequences for our thinking about freedom. Causal laws, while they constrain what we can do, also enable us to do what we can do; we could not act at all where they did not operate. Since causal laws are a function of the structures that exist in the world, and there are alternative possible structures in some aspects of the world e. But more freedom never involves escaping causal interaction, freewheeling. There is no such boundary.
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The world is a common world. Even the bodyactual of each is part of the body-cosmic of all, and thus others may in principle have some legitimate claim over it. If there are boundaries within which an individual may do as they please, these are socially demarked boundaries. It is important to note that this is to a greater or lesser degree. Certainly, I am more causally enmeshed with some parts of the world than with others.
But it does not follow that nothing outside my body-actual can be closer to me than my body-actual.
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I am far more causally dependent for my existence and essence on some beings outside of my body-actual — including some other people — than I am on some parts of my body-actual. Nevertheless, that which we are apportioning in such line-drawing is always power to transform the common world. And so it is always pertinent to ask whether a given exercise of freedom — a given transformation of the common world — is with or without common consent.
The cards are stacked against freedoms to live in a congenial common world, and for freedoms to transform the common world without common consent. And this bias is not just a matter of custom,7 it is backed up by liberal political philosophy, and the whole ontology of the isolated but mobile individual that underlies it. Were the same individuals to make a common decision, and hence have the alternative before them, the result might be quite different. My case is not just that there should be no absolute freedom to transform the common world without common consent, but that there should be much more freedom to transform the common world with and by common consent.
This I call gathered freedom. But there is more to it than that. But here the claim to take that particular power out of the remit of common agreement is dependent upon the closeness to the individual of this bit of their world, its marginality to any other individual. Money-power, however, is dispersed in another sense too. Finally, it is dispersed in that it escapes even its possessor as the market constrains their decisions and transforms the consequences of those decisions.
Gathered freedom, by contrast, is gathered socially, in that common decisions are made about the common world; spatially, in that a community exercises its common power over its common world, i. And temporally in that it is exercised with consideration for the past and future of a community, not only for some instant gain. Perhaps a simple example will clarify the contrasts between gatheredness and dispersedness in the spatial and temporal dimensions I assume it is clear enough in the social dimension.
The other residents object, since the character of their street will be ruined. But since the boundaries of their properties will not be transgressed by the developers, their plea is treated as unreasonable; the space in which they live is treated as dispersed into proprietary plots. Having sketched the ambiguity of freedom, I can perhaps make it sharper, and at the same time remove the grounds for some objections. That Sadean Republic is not viable because it squanders its most precious resource: the bodies-actual of its citizens. I think that both Marxists and ecological critics of Marxism have underestimated the radical nature of the difference between the dispersed economic rationality that governs exchange-value production, and the gathered economic rationality that would govern use-value production.
Secondly, use-values have no common quantitative measure. Calculation could therefore have no place in deciding between different production projects. This does not of course mean that their decision would be arbitrary. They would have to ask themselves the question: what sort of world do we want to live in as a result of our productive activities?
The inorganic body and the ambiguity of freedom 19 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 The desires and self-understanding and information of the community concerned will determine the answer. That is far from arbitrary. For instance: With no objective criterion by which to judge the merit of competing economic alternatives, the determinant necessarily becomes the subjective preference of those who hold power.
It is one necessary condition of economic democracy. In a bureaucratic command economy at least someone is deciding; to make that decision process democratic is one thing; to abdicate it in favour of market forces and the sort of calculability that only makes sense under conditions of the alienation of human powers into market forces, is something different. Marxist theory has a concept of technical progress, e. In use-value terms, one could speak of growth unambiguously only if more of some kinds of use-value were produced without any reduction in other kinds, or any increase in negative use-values.
But in practice, there is always gain and loss, and no commensurability between them.
Am I jettisoning exact ideas in favour of vague ones? In some cases, yes; exact but false for vague but true ones.
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The concept of a consumer, for instance, may be exact enough in its place: we consume bread and cheese and tea and beer. Whatever could be the product and whoever could be the consumer of schooling, for example? There is no answer which is not both misleading and offensive. I am proposing the foregrounding of the notion of the inorganic body, the body-cosmic, as the alternative to those atomisms.
At the time, we all thought the warning unnecessary to native English speakers, but I rather think that a recent semantic shift has made it necessary. When we see something distant, by virtue of our seeing it we make our own being partly constituted by it: it becomes part of us, not by anything we do to it — it remains unchanged — but by becoming part of the world that the perceiver is. But this distinction is not the same as the one I am making. The point is that there will be a number of competing alternatives, each with their objective grounds, and no mathematical aids to the choice between them.
It is not obvious that these are disadvantages, whatever other disadvantages such societies had relative to capitalism.
It might well be rational for a socialist community to take it easy where innovation is concerned. References Curley, Edwin trans. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, trans J. Macquarrie and E.